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AUGUST
2008
ISSUES:
Densification
of Karachi
By
Arif Hasan
I
GATHER from press reports, emails and visits from fellow architects that
the Government of Sindh has decided to get the Karachi Building Control
Authority (KBCA) to revise its building by-laws and zoning regulations
to increase floor area ratios all over the city and in the business and
commercial districts in particular.
A report in the press also mentions that the chief minister even favours
the construction of 100-storey buildings in the metropolis.
In layman’s language, the floor area ratio (FAR) lays down the area
one can construct on a plot of land. For example, if the FAR is 1:6 then
on 1,000 square yards one can construct six times the plot area (or
6,000 square yards) and the building can be any number of storeys unless
there is a height restriction under the by-laws.
The reason being given for increasing the FAR is that it will make
investment in building and real estate more attractive. It is hoped that
this step will also attract foreign investment and reverse the decline
in the real estate and construction business. However, it has to be
understood that the real reason for this decline has less to do with a
low-density FAR and more to do with political uncertainty, a looming
economic crisis, lucrative opportunities in the UAE for real estate
investments, and the graft, corruption and complicated and
time-consuming procedures involved in getting building approvals.
Increasing the FAR means the increasing of densities. It can be argued
that Karachi is a low-density sprawl as compared to other mega cities,
except for certain areas of Gulistan-i-Jauhar, Lyari Town and parts of
Liaquatabad. The latter two have high densities in complete violation of
building by-laws and zoning regulations. It is also true that transport
systems and utilities are relatively expensive to operate and difficult
to manage in large, low-density decentralised cities, especially huge
ones like Karachi. Also, transport systems in such cities are less
likely to be efficient as compared to those in high-density centralised
cities. An increase in density means an increase in the number of
persons living or working per unit of area (which in our case is
calculated per acre). This increase requires a corresponding increase in
infrastructure in terms of water, sewage and electricity. It can be
argued that this can be augmented over time as has been done in many
other cities of the world.
However, it is difficult to understand how we will manage this given the
financial and managerial constraints faced by our planning and
implementation agencies, and the absence of political will and a
consensus between the different actors in our urban drama on overcoming
these constraints.
An increase in density means an increase in vehicular and pedestrian
traffic and requires additional road space and improved transport
systems. The question therefore is how much more traffic (if any at all)
can the existing road network in the areas which the KBCA wishes to
densify accommodate before clogging them up completely? Also, can the
existing transport system take care of the additional number of people
that will move in and out of the densified areas or will they remain
stranded on the roads for hours?
If available data is to be believed, and there is no reason why it
should not be, Karachi’s central business district (CBD) at present
requires transport systems that can cater to at least 20,000 passengers
per hour. This can only be provided by segregated light rail and metro
or through a rapid transit system of buses. Karachi’s transport system
in the CBD currently caters to no more than 3,000 to 4,000 persons per
hour and is under increasing pressure. Therefore, increasing the FAR has
to be accompanied by the building of high-capacity mass transit systems
in the transport sector and improved traffic management. The provision
of appropriate transport systems to cater to high densities will require
at least a decade to plan and complete after decisions regarding them
are taken.
Normally questions related to densification and the nature of the
linkages it requires with transport and utilities are determined by an
urban design exercise which takes place as part of the structure or
development plan for a city. Such an exercise is carried out separately
for different areas.
For Karachi’s commercial districts this would require at least a year
of work (after the terms of reference have been developed and
consultants appointed), another six months of analysis and stakeholder
consultation before by-laws can be framed and may be another few months
before they become law. From the look of things, this process will not
be followed and ad hoc decisions will be taken as they have been taken
in the past. It is therefore suggested that the increase in the FAR
which the politicians are seeking should be determined (if an urban
design exercise is not politically possible) by the number of vehicles
an area can accommodate and the existing transport facilities in that
area. These are not difficult to calculate and the city government has
very competent planners and technocrats who are capable of doing this
and more.
Since by-laws are being revised for the business districts as well, it
is essential that at least 30 per cent or even more of all built-up area
should be reserved for residential accommodation, for two reasons. One,
it will reduce the use of cars and public transport if persons working
in the area also live there. And two, the area will not die at night, as
it does today, and in the process expensive infrastructure and utilities
will be fully utilised. Cities that have grown without proper urban
design exercises or without rational FAR controls during their periods
of economic growth and investment, like Bangkok and Manila in the ’80s
and ’90s, have immense traffic- and transport-related problems which
even mass transit systems and the building of scores of kilometres of
expensive expressways and signal-free roads have not been able to
overcome. Karachi must not be allowed to suffer such a fate. We still
have time.
(By
Arif Hasan, Dawn-7, 19/07/2008)
KWSB
can earn Rs 50b yearly by controlling hydrants, selling water
The Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) can overcome its financial
crisis and earn Rs 49.6 billion annually by managing all hydrants and
selling water, said Orangi Pilot Project Director Perveen Rehman, while
addressing a forum, Water Supply, the present situation, the problems
and their solutions, organized by the Urban Resource Center (URC).
Rehman presented the details of a survey conducted over the last 18
months in collaboration with the URC, KWSB officials and others, to
identify the issues being faced by the KWSB as well as their consumers.
Through a multimedia presentation, Perveen briefed the town
administrations and other stakeholders on various tactics to curb the
water issue.
“There is no water shortage in the city as there is a supply of 695
million gallons of water per day (mgd) from Hub Dam and River Indus. A
huge amount of water, 272 mgd, worth Rs 10 million, is stolen by the
tanker mafia,” she noted. She said that those who can afford water
tankers pay Rs 400 for a 1,000-gallon tanker (4 paisa per gallon) only,
while slums dwellers being supplied by donkey-cart are charged Rs 100
for 25 gallons, 400 percent much more than the tanker, making it a
misconception that it is the poor who are involved in water theft. With
control of all hydrants, including nine legal and 161 illegal ones, a
supply of 272 mgd, the KWSB could earn Rs 49.6 billion annually without
any significant effort. She added that frequent power breakdowns cause a
great hindrance to the smooth supply of water. All 18 towns receive less
then their allocated quota while it is only the cantonment boards and
DHA that are actually getting more water then their quota.
“No one knows who decided the quota of water distribution to different
areas, but we think it was decided on by looking at the financial
position of the residents,” she said.
(By
Jamil Khan, DailyTimes-B1, 04/07/2008)
Prolonged
power cuts as KESC system collapses
Electricity
consumers across the city suffered immensely as the KESC generation and
transmission system collapsed on Tuesday owing to the negligence of the
management of the utility that has reportedly suffered a loss of Rs98
billion during the last seven days.
The utility’s generation has dropped to such a dangerous level that
most consumers were getting power supply for one hour after three hours.
Some areas might be getting electricity for more hours either due to
negligence of the load-dispatch centre or for being hooked to the VIP
feeders. There is no one to monitor the load-dispatch management.
The utility was getting 500MW from Pepco, to which it has to pay a huge
amount, while getting about 210MW from other independent power
producers.
The major reasons of the shortfall of electricity were non-functioning
of units 1 and 4 of the Bin Qasim thermal power plant and unit 4 of the
Korangi power thermal station, a short supply from the Defence
desalination plant, and non-availability of around 80MW power supply
from the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant since Aug 22.
On Tuesday, the BQTPS was generating between 500MW and 600MW while the
Korangi thermal power station was giving 80MW electricity.
The government seems to be unconcerned about the menacing problem and
threat to the country’s economy as there seems to be no intervention
from its side to protect the consumers. The only intervention has been
to the advantage of the privatised management in the form of an increase
in tariff.
Amid looming power riots, traders have slammed the callous and
indifferent attitude of elected representatives of Karachi and
threatened to take over KESC offices if load-shedding was not stopped
immediately.
While the demand was for over 2,200MW, the KESC on its own was
generating a little over 600MW owing to the closure of many units in
what has become a routine. Many of its transformers, which had developed
some trouble and had become idle, have not been activated because no one
seems to be taking an interest in their repairs.
According to sources, the KESC management was closing down different
units everyday to blackmail the government into enhancing tariff, and to
pay its outstanding dues to the gas and oil companies and Pepco and
Wapda. Representatives of the All Pakistan Association of Small Traders
and Cottage Industries, the Karachi chapter, slammed the “corrupt and
incompetent” management of the KESC for the closure of generating
units to blackmail the government and harass the people, who are also
being subjected to inflated bills.
President of the association Mahmood Hamid and others demanded that the
KESC’s privatisation should be scrapped immediately as the management
had failed to fulfil its obligations, and called for ending the monopoly
of electricity distribution utility.
They said the closure of power supply for more than 12 hours had ruined
business and industry and had forced people to spend sleepless nights.
They alleged that the foreign management of the utility was crippling
Pakistan’s economy according to a conspiracy against the country. The
growing power outages had also resulted in unemployment, they said,
adding that about Rs14 billion was lost in a day’s strike and the
utility was doing just that by resorting to load-shedding
Traders’ representatives also slammed the move to increase tariff by
four rupees more and also expressed concern over the handing over of the
company to M/s Abaraj of Dubai. They called for the immediate
investigation into the financial irregularities of the utility and
reasons for not using furnace oil and overusing the gas option.
The question was also raised that when the utility was using gas, a
cheaper mode of generation, why the consumers were being subjected to
hefty bills based on furnace oil.
Ms Khalid of Khyaban-i-Nishat said that for the last one week she had
been experiencing load-shedding for two hours after every two hours.
Residents of block 13-D, 5, and 1 of Gulshan-i-Iqbal said that in eight
hours since Tuesday morning they had suffered six to seven times
disruption of power supply.
Saba Zulfiqar, a resident of Gulshan-i-Iqbal, Block 2, said the day
before yesterday a refrigerator in her house went out of order and on
Tuesday she lost her electric iron due to frequent disruption in
electric supply. She said the electric oven of her house had also not
been working and she suspected that it had also become non-functional
due to the highly precarious power supply situation.
(By
Shamim-ur-Rahman, Dawn-17, 27/08/2008)
As
Decision Makers Dither, Pakistan Water Crisis Deepens
Water
taps choke and spit. Irrigation canals dry up, shrinking farm output and
making food scarce. Suddenly fallow regions are depopulated as villagers
migrate to urban areas. Blackouts and drinking water shortages hit
Karachi and Lahore. Hungry, thirsty, desperate peoples jostle - violence
surges, the country falls apart. As water becomes increasingly scarce
across Pakistan, this apocalyptic scenario is not far from what experts
envision. "The very sustainability of Pakistan as an independent
nation may be at stake, as shortages could lead to increased social
discontent and disharmony amongst the federation and the
provinces," a May 2008 World Bank report on Pakistani
infrastructure warned.
With a population expected to shoot from today's 170 million to 220
million by 2015, the country's already weak water storage capacity will
become woefully inadequate in the very near future. The problem is
particularly acute in a developing nation that relies on water not only
for drinking and agricultural production, but also for energy. Pakistan
is already facing a 4,000 MW power shortage and will likely require
several hydro-electric plants to satisfy demand. Speaking in late April
at a conference on the water crisis in Lahore, Sindh Water Council
Chairman Hafiz Zahoor ul Hassan Dahir said a lack of water could
devastate the country. "Pakistan could become Somalia or
Ethiopia," he said.
In
2007, the World Bank listed Pakistan among 17 nations facing acute water
shortages and noted that the country had used up nearly all of its
surface and groundwater. Indeed, nearly half the population has no local
access to safe drinking water. One quarter of irrigated farmland suffers
from acute salinity.
"Unless plans are put in place urgently," the World Bank
report concluded, "these critical shortages will continue to
undermine the efforts to improve socio-economic indicators and to reduce
poverty."
But which plans, or more accurately, whose? The bank has put forth
several ideas and the government is discussing at least two mega dams.
Various independent experts and non-governmental organizations have
countered with smaller, community-based water storage and usage schemes.
But as Pakistan works to achieve a bright, democratic future, none has
received widespread approval. The hesitation may be warranted.
If
At First You Don't Succeed…
Pakistan's
recent history of World Bank water projects is less than stellar. After
$1 billion and 13 years of construction between 1984 and 1997, the Left
Bank Outfall Drain collapsed under storm surges in 1999 and again in
2003. The LBOD project was financed by the World Bank, Asian Development
Bank, Saudi Fund and U.K.'s Department for International Development,
among others, and implemented by the Pakistani government. It preceded
the World Bank's National Drainage Program, which mostly failed to undo
the damage. Progress reports and a bank-led investigation found that the
poorly designed canal had irrevocably damaged the fragile ecosystem of
the coastal estuaries, failed to benefit most local groups, and made
life more difficult for the poorest of the poor.
More recently, a $130 million emergency rehabilitation project for an
aging reservoir called the Taunsa Barrage, also backed by the World Bank
and executed by Islamabad, led to forced displacements without adequate
compensation, severe river erosion, and a wall breach that killed
several villagers. Locals are pushing for an independent commission to
examine the failures and provide reparations.
Even the Tarbela dam, widely touted as a success, has its faults.
Completed in 1976 some 50 kilometers up the Indus River from Islamabad,
the dam has effectively stored water for agricultural use for some 30
years.
It has reduced seasonal flooding, but also severely curtailed downstream
water supply: The flow of the mighty Indus River, which supplies 90
percent of Pakistan's water, fell to one-fifteenth of what it was in
1947, according to the Water and Power Development Authority of Pakistan
(WAPDA). Further, the waters of the Indus carry a great deal of silt.
Bank and government experts agree that within three years, the Tarbela
dam will become useless because its reservoir will have filled
completely with sediment.
Other water projects have faced problems from the start, including the
plan, approved in 1953, to create a new dam in northwest Punjab's
Kalabagh District. Design and paperwork were completed in 1984 and
construction was set to begin with U.N. Development Program assistance,
World Bank supervision, and WAPDA execution.
Then the real trouble began. Sindh legislators worried that construction
of the dam, occurring far upstream in Punjab Province - which contains
more than half of Pakistan's population and is considered its bread
basket - would curtail their water supply. Two other provinces,
Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province, soon joined the chorus with
the former alleging rule by Punjab fiat and the latter downplaying the
project's anticipated benefit. In 2005, President Pervez Musharraf
overruled the objections and declared the government would go ahead with
the project. But construction had not begun when a new government was
voted into office this February. Some 55 years after it was conceived
the Kalabagh dam exists only on paper as Pakistan's water crisis
deepens.
Despite these hiccups, in late April the World Bank announced it would
spend $8 billion on the construction of the Daimer-Bhasha dam, as well
as two related Indus River projects at $500 million each. The offering
represents one of the bank's largest single country loans - to a nation
with a poor track record for mega-development projects.
Bigger May Not Be Better
Why
have these large projects repeatedly disappointed? There's enough blame
to go around. "The state is culpable, the multilaterals are
culpable of reproducing the failure time and again," said Assim
Sajjad Akhtar, history professor at the Lahore University of Management
Sciences and a leader of the People's Rights Movement, a left-wing
political group. "You have a very deeply entrenched bureaucracy,
and their planning conception is very colonial, paternalistic, top-down;
if you try to give advice, you're not helping, you're committing
sedition."
Projects are designed in a very short-sighted manner, as illustrated by
the impending Tarbela dam failure, Akhtar said. The government rarely
makes design plans public or explains how funds are being spent, he
added, and the resulting constructions are often faulty and spur
discontent among locals.
"The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, all the donors refuse to
accept that they are somewhat responsible for what happens," Akhtar
said. "They are the ones who describe this whole development and
liberalization paradigm as interconnected, but whenever they fail they
say it's not their responsibility."
Development analyst Syed Mohammad Ali, a fellow at the Open Society
Institute, put it this way: "When you go for mega-projects you have
mega-squandering."
The World Bank offered a laundry list of Pakistani shortcomings in a May
2008 report: a lack of adequate education and skills training; a lack of
government commitment, vision, planning, and budgeting ability; corrupt
contracting procedures; no protection against adverse physical
conditions or external processes; delays in payment and absence of
credit; and unfair competition from government-linked contractors and
consultants.
Ayesha Siddiqa, visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania,
argued that the real machinations occur behind the scenes and that
Pakistani farmers have been completely removed from shaping policy.
According to Siddiqa, politicians and bureaucrats do not much care
whether projects succeed.
"The whole thing is political," Siddiqa said, citing the
example of Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan's foreign minister and a
former Farmer's Association of Pakistan leader.
"Instead of putting him in charge of agriculture, they put him in
charge of foreign policy," she noted. "There's a great gap
between growers and policy, between rural and urban populations, and
those gaps will only be narrowed once the government realizes there is a
problem."
Stemming the Crisis
To
Akhtar, the solution is obvious.
"Don't do big projects, do small projects," he said.
Small, community-led projects are more cost-effective, he argued, as
well as more ecologically sustainable and less divisive.
The water minister of neighboring India has expressed similar views.
"The era of big dams is over," Saifuddin Soz told the Indian
Express in late May. "We should have small dams and try and do
something on rainwater harvesting and recharging ground water."
Pakistan faces a more severe water crisis than India, but the minister's
views are relevant.
If the mega-projects were to continue, program managers should take into
greater consideration the needs of affected residents, Akhtar suggested.
"Large projects can only work if the state actually does it [sic]
in a manner where people are not looked at simply as objects to be
transformed," he said. "They have to be the end, not the
means."
Siddiqa takes more of a macro approach to improving water management.
"The problem with this government: It doesn't have a clear-cut
agenda," she said. "To begin with, they have to define their
plan to develop the rural areas, one that appreciates the gaps in the
Pakistan economy and seeks to bridge them."
Projects should include lining all canals to prevent water seepage and
switching from flood irrigation to the drip-sprinkle approach Israel
uses, Siddiqa said. To break the industrialists' monopoly, farmers
should shift away from cash crops. Siddiqa acknowledged such efforts
would be costly, but said that returns would validate the expense.
Ali, the development researcher, recommended a more holistic approach
that takes into account local needs and seasonal river flows, government
capabilities, and donors efforts.
The panel that investigated the failure of the World Bank's LBOD and
National Drainage Program seems to agree.
Its report "highlights the need to take a holistic view of water
and drainage systems to ensure risks are identified and assessed and
harm to people and the natural environment minimized," panel chair
Edith Brown Weiss said upon the report's release in 2006. "We trust
that the Bank's Action Plan will be implemented in close consultation
with affected people."
But the bank appears to have other ideas. Despite identifying a long
list of inadequacies with Pakistan's capacity to build and sustain its
infrastructure, the bank suggested in a recent report that Pakistan
"needs to establish frameworks under which it will deliver say
Bhasha, Kalabagh, Karachi Mass Transit, or other large infrastructure
projects and procure teams based on ‘framework' agreements."
Thus, the World Bank, which employs some of the most well-educated and
skilled development experts, is counting on a series of working
agreements between designers, builders, and suppliers to curb the
failures that have destroyed thousands of livelihoods and bedeviled $1
billion in projects, including the LBOD.
Whether it's small, community-led projects, integrated, holistic
approaches or mega-project partnerships, Pakistan needs to act soon.
"The ethnic divide is huge in Pakistan to begin with, and water is
increasingly a source of that conflict," Akhtar said. In newly
settled regions and along provincial borders and shared irrigation
canals, the tensions are particularly high. "These areas are
waiting to explode," he explained. "It's a time bomb."
(By
David Lepeska, posted on devex.com, 01/07/2008)
Karachi
traders pay millions in protection money
Millions
of rupees change hands in this commercial capital of Pakistan everyday
in the form of bhatta or protection money. The beneficiaries include all
sorts of people, from ordinary police constables to officials sitting at
the top echelons of power, while the payment is made by hawkers,
shopkeepers, motorists, traders, industrialists, land grabbers, and the
like.
According
to a survey conducted by the Urban Resource Centre (URC), hawkers at the
Saddar and Lea Market area pay Rs25 million per month as extortion
money. The informal sector is in fact a constant and lucrative source of
illegal earnings.
Bhatta
or protection money is collected by one of the vendors every day and
then handed over to employees of traffic police, the [now defunct]
Karachi Metropolitan Corporations land department, and area station
house officer (SHO), a police official said requesting anonymity. He
said the extortion money is also collected by the employees of the City
District Government Karachi (CDGK) and Karachi Electric Supply
Corporation. Shopkeepers have to suffer immensely if they did not pay
bhatta to the police. The entire attention of the Preedy police is
focused on collecting bhatta from vendors. Police mobiles are busy in
collecting money between 5pm to 9pm and this is the most opportune time
for robbers to loot the people, says Mairaj Ahmed Khan, general
secretary of Zargran (Jewellers) Welfare Association. He says failure to
pay bhatta results in high repercussions and the police instead of
investigating robberies and apprehending them, harass jewellers. Even
hawkers who have authorised businesses are made to suffer.
Web
posted at: 6/16/2008 1:16:0
Source:
Internews,
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=World_News&subsection=Pakistan+%26+Sub-Continent&month=June2008&file=World_News200806161160.xml
We
top Asia’s cheapest cities to live in
Surprise,
surprise! Finally some good news: Karachi continues to be the least
costly city in Asia, in 141st place with a score of 54.7 in a survey of
the cheapest to live in carried out by human resources firm Mercer.
Moscow has topped the league of the most expensive cities for
expatriates to live in for the third year running, BBC News reported
Thursday. The research took account of expenses such as rent, eating out
and petrol. Moscow has particularly expensive coffee, with a cup in a
café costing $10.40 (5.19) including service. Tokyo climbed two spots
into second place in the survey, followed by London, which dropped one
place into third, and Oslo, which came fourth.
The survey compared the cost of 200 items in 143 cities. The three
cheapest cities were Karachi in Pakistan, Quito in Ecuador and Asuncion
in Paraguay. “Although the traditionally expensive cities of Western
Europe and Asia still feature in the top 20, cities in Eastern Europe,
Brazil and India are creeping up the list,” Yvonne Traber, a principal
and research manager at Mercer, commented. “Conversely, some locations
such as Stockholm and New York now appear less costly by comparison.
“Our research confirms the global trend in price increases for certain
foodstuffs and petrol, though the rise is not consistent in all
locations. This is partly balanced by decreasing prices for certain
commodities such as electronic and electrical goods. We attribute this
to cheaper imports from developing countries, especially China, and to
advances in technology.”
For Mercer, keeping on top of the changes in expatriate cost of living
is essential so companies can ensure their employees are compensated
fairly and at competitive rates when stationed abroad.
“In some cases, cost of living increases may be correlated to
countries with a high rate of economic growth. Companies may assign high
priority to expansion in these economies but may have to deal with
inflationary pressures due to competition for expatriate-level housing
and other services, as observed in our surveys,” she noted.
In the UK, as well as London slipping one place, Birmingham dropped from
41st to 66th, while Glasgow fell from 36th to 69th. In addition to
London dropping one place, two additional UK cities, Birmingham and
Glasgow, have both moved down in the rankings, dropping from 41st to
66th (score 85.4) and 36th to 69th (score 84), respectively.
Both Dubai and Abu Dhabi have dropped significantly this year,
positioned at 52 (score 89.3) and 65 (score 85.7), respectively. This is
mainly due to the UAE dirham being pegged to the US dollar.
The only North American city to feature in this year’s top 50 is New
York in 22nd place (score 100), dropping seven places in one year. All
other US cities have also experienced a significant decline in the
rankings. For example, Los Angeles has moved from 42nd to 55th place
(score 87.5), Miami from 51st to 75th place (score 82) and Washington,
DC, from 85th to 107th place (score 74.6).
“The decline in the ranking of all US cities is due to the weakening
value of the US dollar against most major world currencies,” said
Mitch Barnes, principal at Mercer in the US. “The dollar has been
declining steadily for the past several years, which has resulted in an
overall decrease in the cost of living in 19 US cities, relative to
other major global cities studied.
In 54th place (score 88.1), jumping 28 places from last year, Toronto is
the most expensive city for expatriates in Canada. All other Canadian
cities in the survey have experienced similar rises, with Vancouver
moving from 89th to 64th (score 85.8), Calgary from 92nd to 66th (score
85.4) and Montréal from 98th to 72nd with a score of 83. This reverses
last year’s trend which saw Canadian cities decline, and places them
back where they have traditionally been rated. The Canadian dollar has
appreciated nearly 15% against the US dollar.
Whilst the five top-scoring cities in Asia remain relatively stable in
the ranking there have been significant changes further down the list.
In India, Mumbai moves up four places to reach 48, whereas New Delhi
climbs 13 places to 55 due to the strengthening of the India rupee
against the US dollar. Although India has experienced relatively high
inflation, this has increased at similar pace to New York and has
therefore had a reduced impact on its cities’ rise in the rankings.
Sydney continues to be the most expensive city for expatriates in this
region. Melbourne follows in 36th place and Perth climbs 31 places.
(DailyTimes-B1,
25/07/2008)
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